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Abstract
In the 21st century, capital punishment in the United States stands
as a peculiar institution. Despite widespread international movements
for its abolition, and widespread expert agreement on its ills, the death
penalty still persists in the United States. America remains the only
country in the Western world to retain the death penalty today. We use it
frequently, executing approximately 52 people per year, a rate comparable
to both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The question of why the United States
still retains the death penalty has been the subject of debate for decades.
Countless historical explanations have been posited, ranging from the
religious to the political, from the racial, to the legal. The historical analysis
of modern social institutions is important -- they help us understand why
and how such institutions came to be normatively accepted and persistent
in the world today. In this paper I will set out to examine why the United
States retained the death penalty despite its initial suspension in 1972 by
the Supreme Court under Furman v. Georgia. In doing so I will relate the
narratives of two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, and
their experience with abolition in the post-World War II era.

Introduction
“For centuries the death penalty, often accompanied by barbarous
refinements, has been trying to hold crime in check; yet crime persists.”
Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death1
In the 21st century, capital punishment in the United States stands
as a peculiar institution. Despite widespread international movements for
its abolition, the death penalty still persists in the United States. America
remains the only country in the Western world to retain the death penalty.
We use it frequently, executing approximately fifty-two people per year, a
rate comparable to that of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.2
The question of why the United States still retains the death penalty
has been the subject of debate for decades. Countless historical explanations
have been posited, ranging from the religious3 to the political,4 from the
116

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Avinash Samarth
racial5 to the legal.6 The historical analysis of modern social institutions is
important -- they help us understand why and how such institutions came to
be normatively accepted and persistent in the world.
In this paper I will set out to examine why the United States retained
the death penalty despite its initial suspension in 1972 by the Supreme Court
under Furman v. Georgia. In doing so I will relate the narratives of two
countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, and their experience
with abolition in the post-World War II era.
Part I will detail the American narrative. I will capture the main
abolitionist movement in the United States, which occurred between 1960
and 1976.
Part II will detail the British narrative. The major modern British
abolitionist movement occurred slightly earlier than its American counterpart,
from 1948 to 1969.
Part III will examine some potential explanations for the trajectories
of these narratives. In doing so I will weigh the evidence for the impact
of entrepreneurial political elite and public opinion, on the trajectory of
abolition in both of these countries. Both explanations have very commonly
been proposed and analyzed. The international comparison, moreover, will
tease out parallels and/or contradictions to delineate what aspects of the
American narrative can be explained with each.
Part IV will examine the impact of the textual, written Constitution
of the United States in the persistence of the death penalty and will compare
it to that of the British experience. The United States and the United Kingdom
differ in terms of their approaches to constitutionality. The American
Constitution is codified. Codified constitutions are written and contain
textual provisions that are binding on all state institutions and practices. The
United Kingdom, on the other hand, has no formal written constitution -it is “uncodified.” Instead of a single document, the English constitution is
derived from a number of sources, including the laws passed by Parliament
and from precedents established by judicial decisions. As a result, Parliament
is not answerable to a ‘higher law;’ rather it can “make or unmake any law
on any subject whatsoever.”7 More importantly for this analysis, capital
punishment in England was not understood through any ambiguous
normative standard that derived from an authoritative text. This is not the
case in America, where the Constitution, specifically the Eighth Amendment,
provided such a standard with which to judge capital punishment.
From compiling these explanations together, I will conclude that
although the influence of elite policy entrepreneurs and public opinion
can, together, explain: (1) the initial movements for the abolition of capital
punishment; and (2) why capital punishment became a prominent issue
for British and American governments, it cannot adequately explain why
America reneged on its abolition of the death penalty.
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I will also conclude that there is a tenable case to be made of the
influence of the ambiguously written Constitution in veering the United States
off its abolitionist path and pushing the country towards a reinstatement.
I will show that the reasons for this phenomenon were twofold. First, the
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment into the capital punishment debate
diverted time and attention away from the discussion on the efficacy of capital
punishment itself, a debate that the abolitionists in England showed could be
won with objective data. Second, the shift of the debate to the meaning of
“cruel and unusual punishments” moved the discussion away from social
scientific searches for measurable behavior patterns towards interpretive
searches for the best understanding of normative concepts.
Part I: The American Narrative
1960s and Prior: The Declining American Death Penalty
The American 1960s were marked with strong movements towards
civil and political rights, increased application of the social sciences to
public policy, and a renewed interest in humanitarian public policies. In
the wake of the Second World War, an increasing number of American
politicians became concerned with preserving the “sanctity of human life”
in both the political and legal realms.8 The attitude of the sixties was visibly
present in its treatment of the death penalty. Throughout the decade,
capital punishment met not only challenges to its legal codification, but also
waned in frequency as a practice used by law enforcement, establishing two
strong and identifiable paths towards abolition.
The first path edged towards the de jure abolition of capital
punishment in the United States. Even in the earliest part of the decade,
opponents attacked American capital punishment “on several fronts” with
an unprecedented furor.9 Members of Congress introduced bills to end
particular mandatory capital punishment statutes, and other members
introduced bills that banned capital punishment in its entirety.
Movements also occurred on grassroots levels. Churches and
religious groups put pressure on both state and federal governments to
change existing death penalty statutes.10 Elite opinion had begun to move
away from supporting the death penalty, and even public support of the
death penalty, which had always been relatively strong, fell to its weakest
points in this decade.11 While in 1953, 70 percent of the public supported
capital punishment, by 1966 that figure was down to 42 percent.12
Within various state legislatures around the country, the death
penalty lost even more battles. While Congress refused to ban the use of
capital punishment, nine states (Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, and West Virginia) completely and explicitly
abolished capital punishment by 1967.131415
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In some of these cases, state legislatures were the actors that
orchestrated the end of their states’ practices of capital punishment. In
1963, for instance, the Michigan legislature amended its state constitution to
prevent any possible attempts to reinstate the death penalty.16 Movements
in other states were driven at the level of the citizenry. Oregon abolished the
death penalty in 1964 by way of a public referendum, which passed with a
large majority.17
The second abolitionist path was towards a de facto abolition of
capital punishment, emerging as law enforcement officials sought and
applied the death penalty less often. For even though forty-one states still
had capital punishment on the books by the end of the 1960s, the frequency
with which executions were carried out was dropping drastically, and the
practice as a whole was becoming increasingly rare in the United States.
Kansas, for example, ended up observing a de facto moratorium on capital
punishment in the early sixties, because its Republican governor “just
[didn’t] like killing people.”18 Judges, prosecutors, and juries were all more
reluctant to impose the death penalty than in the past, preferring to dole out
life sentences instead.1920 It appeared that even without significant abolitionist
activity or grand legislative actions, the death penalty was falling out of favor
throughout the country.21
The data illustrate this trend. In 1960, fifty-seven people were executed
in total across the United States. This was down enormously from the earlier
years of the twentieth century, in which as many as nearly 200 people were
executed annually. As the sixties wore on, the frequency of executions fell
even further: in 1963, twenty-one individuals were executed, in 1964, fifteen
individuals were executed, and in 1965, the number executed had fallen to
only seven. By 1968, a de facto moratorium on capital punishment was in
effect in the United States, and no persons were executed for the rest of the
decade.22
The 1960s Legislative Debates over the Death Penalty
As capital punishment came under increasing fire during the 1960s,
members of the 86th, 87th, and 89th Congresses introduced several bills that
were either partial steps towards or complete plans for its abolition. Although
few of these proposals were ultimately enacted, they do provide valuable
insight into the frame of the debates that occurred in the federal legislatures
of the sixties regarding capital punishment. These debates reveal a strong
focus on two points of interest: deterrence and morality.
The major federal bills regarding capital punishment are enumerated
as follows, in chronological order. In 1960, Representative Abraham Multer
(D-NY) introduced H.R. 870, a bill to ban all capital punishment on the federal
level.23 In 1962, Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR) attempted twice to amend H.R.
5143 to prevent all executions in the District of Columbia.24 In 1966, Senator
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Philip Hart (D-MI) introduced a bill in the Senate (S. 3646), joined by nine
other senators, abolishing the death penalty for all federal crimes.25 Also in
1966, Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-WI) introduced a bill to abolish
the death penalty in its totality, under “all laws of the United States.”2627
The leading concern in discussing these bills, as Representative
Multer pointed out in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee
in support of H.R. 870, was “whether we can justify the death penalty on
the ground that it prevents or deters crime.”28 As bills, amendments, and
arguments were levied against or for capital punishment, each side stressed
the issue of deterrence. Concerning H.R. 870, Representative Multer
immediately submitted into the record the results of Great Britain’s 1953
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which could find no link between
the death penalty and murder rates.29 Senator Hart, when introducing S. 3646
in the Senate, focused the debate on what he called the “key question” -whether or not “the death penalty deter[s] and prevent[s] similar crimes in
the future.” He then published six statements of penologists, professors, and
police officers, all testifying that it did not.30
Senator Morse similarly called upon a wealth of expert articles and
testimony to justify what he viewed as the first of his main points regarding
the death penalty, deterrence. He declared that:
“It is pretty well established by a great many research studies, and
pretty well established in the authoritative writings of many of our
criminologists and penologists, that many
people labor under
the misconception that capital punishment is an effective deterrent
to crime. The research studies do not bear that out […].”31
Senator Morse “assure[d] everyone” that he would “urge that
criminologists and penologists be called in to testify” on the issue of
deterrence. In the meantime, he placed in the record two articles explicitly to
“demonstrate how capital punishment has failed to deter crime.”32
But arguments over deterrence were not solely the concern of
the death penalty abolitionists. The second concern that the congressmen
consistently identified was the issue of morality. These arguments claimed
either that the death penalty is wrong because ‘thou shalt not kill,’ or that the
death penalty is legitimate because of ‘eye-for-an-eye’ principles of justice.
Representative Multer argued, “There is a moral question involved in the
justice of capital punishment” because “innocent men have been executed”
and “life is sacred.”33 He explained, “Only God with his infinite wisdom
and charity should wield that awful power [to execute].”34 Senator Morse
similarly argued, “The taking of life is the prerogative of God, and not of
men.”35 In the same speech, Morse summarized his points against the death
penalty:
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“First, I consider it to be immoral. Second, I do not consider it to be
an effective deterrent to crime. Third, I think the time has come when
we ought to set a good example of high civilization and make clear
that we no longer resort to the eye-for-an-eye […] jungle law.”36
The Involvement of the Courts
Up until the end of the 1960s, the courts had nothing to say about the
constitutionality of the death penalty itself. Not only had the death penalty
been widely accepted throughout the nation’s history, its constitutionality per
se had never been formally challenged in any court.37 In fact, the practice had
been in wide use at the time the Constitution was written and implemented,
and few people, if any, thought that the Constitution had any sort of implicit
or explicit goal of abolishing capital punishment.38 Illustrative of this general
understanding, neither litigants, nor the press, nor public interest groups
had ever focused on the constitutionality of capital punishment itself in any
substantial manner.39 Even the American Civil Liberties Union did not, at
the time, consider capital punishment to be a civil rights issue.40 But as the
transformative sixties continued, and as the Warren Court gave a friendlier
ear to minority-held and liberal ideas, it appeared that the Court might finally
be poised to wrestle with the issue of capital punishment on constitutional
grounds.41
The first steps toward court involvement regarding the
constitutionality of the death penalty came not in the forms of amicus briefs or
arguments from litigants or interest groups, but came instead from the ‘topdown’ -- from constitutional experts and a particularly interested Supreme
Court Justice. In 1961, attorney Gerald Gottlieb published a prominent article
in the University of Southern California Law Review contending that the
American death penalty was of questionable constitutionality, specifically
crafting his argument under the Eighth Amendment.42 Gottlieb was not
concerned whether or not capital punishment deterred crime. Rather, he
argued that the death penalty had become unconstitutional because of
the “changed standards of decent conduct” in modern times.43 He linked
these standards to the Eighth Amendment and its dynamic ban on “cruel
and unusual punishments” by way of Trop v. Dulles,44 a case in which the
Supreme Court held that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment was not very
precise, and therefore “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”45 Gottlieb’s novel
argument helped set the legal stage for the courts to address the question of
capital punishment outside of the domain of the legislature, and within the
domain of the Constitution.
Two years later, Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg circulated a
memorandum to the other eight Justices on the Supreme Court regarding six
capital cases for which certiorari petitions were pending.46 Justice Goldberg
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specifically discussed the constitutionality of the death penalty and the
possible arguments with which the practice could be challenged.47 This type
of memorandum was unusual for a Supreme Court Justice, and surprising
to many on the Court, including Justice William Brennan, who observed,
“in not one of the six cases had any party directly challenged the validity of
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”48
Despite Justice Goldberg’s efforts, the six cases were not granted
certiorari. This still gave him an opportunity to publish a dissenting opinion
against the denial of certiorari, which he did for Rudolph v. Alabama49. He
suggested that the Court “should have heard the case to consider whether
the Constitution permitted the imposition of death on a convicted rapist
who has neither taken nor endangered human life.”50 Goldberg also made
reference to Trop v. Dulles in the same manner as had Gottlieb two years
prior, similarly asking whether or not the “imposition of the death penalty
[…] violate[s] ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of [our]
maturing society,”51 giving more credence to the possible link between the
Eighth Amendment and capital punishment.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Goldberg awakened a strong
interest in bringing the issue of capital punishment into the realm of
litigation. Michael Meltsner, the assistant counsel to the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in the 1960s, wrote that before Goldberg’s dissent, “no one
seriously considered making the enormous effort that would be required” to
challenge the constitutionality of capital punishment.52 But although interest
in challenging capital punishment in the courts had just been awakened, it
was quickly and cleverly put into action. The NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund
(often referred to as ‘The Fund’), joined in the late 1960s by the ACLU, was
the leading group behind this effort.
By the mid-sixties, the movement for anti-capital punishment
litigation had “gained impressive momentum.”53 Courts on both federal
and state levels rendered decisions of one kind or another regarding capital
punishment statutes. Until 1972, the Supreme Court frequently modified the
procedures and methods by which capital punishment could be carried out
in the United States.
In 1968 the Supreme Court rendered the first blow to capital
punishment, delivered in their opinion of Witherspoon v. Illinois.54
Prosecutors at the time could reject potential jury members because of their
conscientious qualms about capital punishment, and in the case of William
C. Witherspoon, the prosecution had used this justification to dismiss half of
the potential jury pool. The Supreme Court ruled that such a practice gave an
unfair bias to the prosecution and deprived the defendant of the right to an
impartial jury.55 While Witherspoon did not address capital punishment on
the grounds of the Eighth Amendment, it did create a significant hurdle for
prosecutors intent on seeking the death penalty in their cases. And because
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of the significant blow to capital punishment Witherspoon was thought to
represent, the decision announced to potential litigants that the Supreme
Court held a favorable attitude toward criticisms of capital punishment.
Fund attorneys were relentless in attempting to get the Court to rule
on the constitutional arguments they were advancing. In Boykin v. Alabama,56
the attorneys argued that the infrequent, arbitrary, and discriminatory use
of the death penalty as a punishment for robbery was “cruel and unusual”
per the Eighth Amendment.57 The Court, however, skipped over these
arguments and remanded the case back to the state trial court on the ground
that Boykin’s guilty pleas had not been entered properly (there was no record
the Boykin had made them “voluntarily and understandingly”).58
The next year, Fund lawyers made another attempt in Maxwell v.
Bishop,59 challenging the practice of a unitary capital trial, in which a jury
will rule on guilt and punishment simultaneously. The Court again ignored
the constitutional arguments levied by the Fund lawyers and sent the case
back to a state trial court on the ground that Witherspoon had been violated
(Maxwell had been sentenced by a jury that prosecutors had filtered out so
that it did not contain citizens who were wary of capital punishment).60
In 1972, the Supreme Court heard the case of Furman v. Georgia61
and finally addressed the constitutional arguments presented by the Fund
lawyers. The attorneys levied several arguments, both targeting capital
punishment per se and Georgia’s capital punishment statute in particular.
In the attorneys’ most heavy-hitting argument, they claimed that the “death
penalty, as administered in the second half of the twentieth century, [is]
inconsistent with evolving standards of decency.”62 Drawing upon Trop
v. Dulles, the attorneys hoped to convince the Supreme Court Justices that
capital punishment had become a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution.
But in contemplating these issues the Supreme Court found itself
very divided. By the time its decision was handed down, there was no
majority opinion in the case. Instead, each Justice had written his own
opinion. There were five concurring opinions, written by Justices Brennan,
Douglas, Marshall, Stewart, and White, and four dissenting opinions, written
by Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.63
The concurring Justices agreed that the death penalty statutes
presented before the Court were “arbitrary and capricious” and therefore
in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishment.”64 Even so, there were large points of disagreement among
these Justices. Only Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall regarded capital
punishment per se as unconstitutional. The other three, Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White, limited their objections to the way in which capital
punishment was meted out under Georgia’s death penalty statute (for reasons
that also applied to thirty-nine other capital punishment statutes in the
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United States). Together, the Justices believed that Georgia’s statute, under
which Furman was being tried, could and would lead to arbitrary sentencing.
They identified jury discretion as the problem: because the law gave the jury
too much power in deciding whether or not to execute a defendant, the law
thereby allowed jurors’ prejudices to impact sentencing decisions.65 This
meant that executions were decided “wantonly and freakishly.”66
Despite these differing opinions, Furman effectively rendered capital
punishment, as it then existed under forty U.S. Federal and State laws,
unconstitutional. The positions of Douglas, Stewart, and White, however,
made it clear that the Supreme Court did not believe that capital punishment
itself was unconstitutional. Rather, the methods by which it was meted out
at the time made it unconstitutional.
Unsurprisingly, several states took the next few years to rewrite their
death penalty statutes in efforts to meet the criticisms levied by Douglas,
Stewart, and White. In 1976, several of these laws came before the Supreme
Court in a slew of cases: Gregg v. Georgia67, Jurek v. Texas,68 Proffitt v.
Florida,69 Woodson v. North Carolina,70 and Roberts v. Louisiana.71 These
cases were consolidated into Gregg and decided on July 2, 1976, just four
years after the Furman decision .
In a 7-2 decision the Court upheld death penalty statutes that gave
juries “guided discretion” for invoking the death penalty, finding these
versions of capital punishment not to be unconstitutionally arbitrary.72 The
opinion of the 1976 Court also noted that capital punishment itself did not
violate the Eighth Amendment, citing the “marked indication of society’s
endorsement of the death penalty, […] [in] the legislative response to
Furman.”73 Paying close attention to public opinion polls, the Gregg decisions
reinstated capital punishment, effectively ending the moratorium imposed
by Furman.74
Executions resumed on January 17, 1977, when a Utah firing squad
shot and killed Gary Gilmore, a convicted killer who had requested execution
by that means.75
The 1970s Legislative Debates over the Death Penalty
The unexpected voice of the Supreme Court regarding the
constitutionality of capital punishment toward the end of the 1960s and into
the 1970s reverberated in the debates of the 91st, 92nd, and 93rd Congresses.
While the 1960s saw a relatively large number of debates over the issue
compared to other periods of American history, the frequency of such debate
in the 1970s dwarfed even those. Legislators campaigning against capital
punishment scrambled to formally suspend the death penalty, worrying
that the de facto and unstable judicial moratorium could easily fall apart,
resulting in an extraordinary bloodbath. Legislators campaigning to protect
capital punishment scrambled to pass laws that they believed would stand
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up against the Court’s judicial review. Each side recognized the importance
standards of decency” point towards the “repudiation of automatic death
sentences.”89 The Court ruled that the various legislatures that passed these
new statutes had effectively remedied the capriciousness found in earlier
applications of the death penalty and had avoided problems under the Eighth
Amendment.90 In later decisions, the Court returned to the constitutionality
of specific methods and practices with which capital punishment was meted
out, rather than reconsidering the constitutionality of the punishment itself.
The 1960s trend toward abolition did not only reverse in the realm
of the federal courts after the Gregg decisions. By the late 1970s, public
opinion was swinging evermore strongly in favor of the death penalty, and
the frequency with which it was challenged in both the state legislatures
and Congress fell drastically.91 Juries and judges both became much more
willing to sentence defendants to death, evidenced by the explosion of the
number of people on death row after the moratorium was lifted. By the end
of the twentieth century, the frequency of executions had returned to levels
reminiscent of the early 1950s, and death row was over ten times larger than
it had been in the early sixties.92
Part II: The English Narrative
The 1940s: Ambiguity in the Debate
By the 1940s, capital punishment had been in widespread use for
centuries in the United Kingdom. But from the early 1800s to the late 1920s,
there was a steady march to curb both its frequency and its severity.93 While
these slow movements accomplished some feats, including a decrease in the
number of crimes punishable by death and the end of all public executions,
it was not until the late 1940s that efforts for complete abolition of the death
penalty began to be taken seriously in government. After World War II, as
the nation “felt sickened by [...] wholesale slaughter” and the “holocaust of
Nazi Germany”94, the British Parliament began to consider the possibility of
abolishing the death penalty from all future use. These sentiments created a
prime opportunity for Parliament to begin serious debate over the abolition
of capital punishment in the 1940s. But in all of these debates, information
was sparse, and opposing arguments frequently cited contradictory facts,
especially in regards to the efficacy of the practice.
As it existed at the time, the “punishment for murder prescribed
by English law was […] the punishment of death.”95 Capital punishments
for murder were largely mandatory in nature -- judges had no power with
which to discriminate in doling out capital punishments in certain murder
cases over others. And although by the twentieth century murder was the
only crime for which the death penalty was exercised in practice, there were
still on average 12 persons executed per year in Britain.96
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The laws of murder, however, came under fire in the years directly
after the War’s end early 1945.97 In May of that year, the Labour Party won
an unprecedented victory in national elections, and for the first time in
British history the democratic-socialist party held a large majority of seats in
the House of Commons.98 With a party known to be favorable towards the
lessening of penal severity in a position of substantial power, the Howard
League began a significant “propagandistic” assault upon the British
death penalty.99 The Howard League, amalgamated from two earlier penal
reform interest groups in 1921, was an influential “insider” organization
in British politics.100 Its members were largely middle-class and wealthy
professionals and it “functioned as a small, well-connected, London-based
elite” organization.101 The Howard League held it partly to be their mission
to publish and disseminate informational pamphlets urging the electorate to
move towards abolition.102
But alongside their goal of educating public opinion on the moral ills
of the death penalty, the group worked hard to urge members of Parliament
to take action in London. Coming before the House of Commons in 1947
was the Criminal Justice Bill,103 introduced by Home Secretary ChuterEde and aimed at humanizing the British penal processes.104 The Howard
League urged “that the Criminal Justice Bill [of 1947] should include a clause
abolishing the death penalty” and they received support from 190 members
of Parliament in response to their efforts.105
When the 1947 Criminal Justice Bill was read in the House of
Commons, it stimulated an unprecedented flood of debate regarding the
abolition of capital punishment.106 Sydney Silverman and Reginald Paget,
two members of the Labour Party who vehemently criticized the death
penalty, made the strongest speeches. Silverman emphasized the need for a
strong movement against capital punishment to emanate from the House of
Commons.107 He believed the House of Commons to be a true representation
of the educated opinion of the British people and argued that the people
themselves should ultimately decide the fate of the death penalty.108
Silverman expressly noted that little dependence should be placed upon
judges, who, he rhetorically exclaimed, “have always been demonstrably
and completely wrong.”109 Silverman believed the House of Commons, as
opposed to all other components of British politics, provided a good “crosssection of the mind of the community.”110
Paget crystallized his arguments in two ways: he first criticized the
nature of capital punishment as a primitive act of retribution and second noted
that there is “really only one question” of capital punishment: deterrence.111
Paget was also concerned by the power of government to take away the life
of an individual: “Let the dictators have their gallows and their axes, their
firing squads and their lethal chambers. The citizens of a free democracy did
not have to shelter under the shadow of the gallows tree.”112
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The Howard League declared on the first page of its journal in 1948
that the extended debates over capital punishment during the readings of
the Criminal Justice Bill were the “beginning of the end” of the death penalty
in Britain.113 Not only did the debates legitimize the issue of abolition in
Parliament, but they also spread interest within the general public. The
Times, for instance, took up the topic beginning in the late 1940s. In a leading
editorial in November 1947, the newspaper asked whether “the death
penalty deter[s] more effectively than other punishment,” and answered its
own question, stating, “nowhere has abolition led to an increase in crime.”114
The Times, as a whole, conveyed an air of support for the abolitionist side
and would continue to do so throughout the coming decades.
The next year, in March of 1948, Sydney Silverman sponsored an
amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill to put a de jure moratorium on the
British death penalty for a period of five years. Debates once again centered
on the principles on which capital punishment was based and the efficacy
of the practice as a deterrent against crime. Silverman reiterated Paget’s
remarks from the previous debate, arguing that the retributive principle of
punishment was fundamentally wrong and that it was the duty of Parliament
to raise the standards of human conduct after the horrors seen in World
War II.115 While Silverman opened the debate by characterizing the death
penalty as “revolting” and “barbarous,” opponents like Sir John Anderson
emphasized their faith in the efficacy of the death penalty.116 Anderson noted
that to his own knowledge, he could not think of anyone who had been
wrongly executed.117
The clause passed the House of Commons by a vote of 245 to 222
and was added to the Criminal Justice Bill, which itself also passed, and so
on June 1 and 2, the issue of abolition was put before the House of Lords.118
The House of Lords was not nearly as favorable towards the idea of abolition
as the House of Commons, and this soon became apparent in debate. The
“great bulk of speeches delivered” on the bill were in favor of the retention
of the death penalty.119 Nevertheless, debate was extensive, lasting for two
days.120
While a handful of members supported the clause, the vast majority
of Lords stood against its passage. Viscount Templewood, standing in
favor of the clause, cited Sweden and Switzerland as empirical examples of
governments that had shown that murderers could be reformed and did not
need to be killed to be deterred from killing again.121 The Lord Archbishop
Canterbury, on the other hand, criticized the evidence from other countries,
noting, “nobody can say how far any individual is deterred by that warning
[of death].”122 Lord Pethick-Lawrence recognized the same, but used this as
platform for supporting the clause, noting, “quite […] frankly, I say that if it
were proved to me conclusively, […] that the abolition of capital punishment
would lead to an increase in the murder rate, I would not stand for its
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abolition.”123 Lord Roche, basing his opinion “on [his] experience,” argued
that in practice, the death penalty was only applied to those who society
truly needed to execute, and the rest he believed had been reprieved.124
Although Viscount Templewood was very vocal throughout the debate,
offering frequent commentary against the retentionists’ arguments, the
House of Lords rejected the abolitionist clause by an overwhelming 181 to
28.125
The question of public opinion took on a larger role during and
after the 1948 debates in the House of Commons. Although there was little
data on the topic at the time, there was “some indication that the nation as
a whole did not support the suspension of capital punishment” as voted by
the House of Commons.126 Letters written in to The Times, for instance, were
overwhelmingly retentionist. The very notion of public opinion, however,
was debated heatedly in Parliament in the context of abolition. While
Silverman had argued that the question of abolition should not be left up
to judges, he also noted that the whims of the general, uneducated, and
ignorant public should not be decisive on abolition. Viscount Templewood
made similar remarks, arguing that the opinions of the general public were
inevitably ignorant about the proper issues in debate over abolition.127
Viscount Samuel pointed out that the large majority in favor of abolition in
the House of Commons was probably even larger than had been recorded, as
ministers in favor of abolition had been compelled to abstain.128 He believed
that the extreme divergence between the public and the House of Commons
was evidence that the true opinion of the ‘public’ was wholly misinformed on
the issue of capital punishment. Viscount Templewood agreed, noting that
if Parliament had relied upon public opinion in the past when restricting the
death penalty, it would have found that public opinion was always against
the “expert” views of Parliament.129 Whether or not to take into account the
opinion of the public, and who exactly constituted ‘the public,’ were issues
not resolved by the end of the 1940s.
As the debate over the abolitionist measure unfolded, it became clear
that the British politicians were severely lacking in objective information
about capital punishment. Many members of Parliament resorted to their
own experiences or hearsay anecdotes to support their arguments, and many
of them cited bits of information that clearly contradicted each other. There
was, at the time, a general lack of “basic information on the actual effects of
capital punishment.”130 Criminal statistics were virtually unknown, foreign
experience was difficult to obtain or relate back to English terms, and prior
Royal Commission reports were much like the arguments of reformers:
collections of Biblically based, morality-fueled opinions on the “evils of
the death penalty.”131 In an effort to remedy this lack of information, Home
Secretary Chuter Ede announced a Royal Commission in 1949 to empirically
study the question of limiting the death penalty in Great Britain.132
128

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Avinash Samarth
The 1950s: A Royal Commission and Shifts in the National Atmosphere
In the 1950s capital punishment developed into a major issue in
British politics. The reasons for this were threefold. First, the 1953 report
published by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which
distinguished itself from prior commissions by relying on the social sciences
and solid facts, rather than mere conjecture, identified several shortcomings
of the death penalty.133 Second, the Fifties in England were marred by
high-profile capital cases that resulted in executions largely thought by the
public to be miscarriages of justice. Third, eager abolitionist members of
Parliament, supported whole-heartedly by the Howard League and armed
with the evidence of the Royal Commission, took advantage of the wavering
atmosphere over capital punishment. These three forces led to two major
legislative developments: the introduction of the Death Penalty (Abolition)
Bill of 1956 and the compromise that resulted from its failure, the Homicide
Bill of 1957.134
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment finished their
investigation by 1953. After hearing the testimony of 118 witnesses and
producing a report that exceeded five hundred pages, the Commission
officially recommended a series of modifications to the practice of capital
punishment. These included giving discretion to juries over when to impose
the death penalty, as well as replacing the current method of execution,
hanging, with lethal injection.135 From Europe, the Commission listened
“almost exclusively to experts -- criminologists, prison officials, judges,
doctors, [and] criminal law professors.”136
Witnesses testifying in front of the Commission gave facts and
opinions that were centered on the deterrent value of the death penalty.
Sir Frank Newsam, permanent undersecretary at the Home Office, testified
that in his experience, the average murderer was not of irredeemably bad
character, and did not especially need to be deterred from ever committing a
crime again by imposing death.137
The Chief Constables’ Association of England and Wales and the
Police Federation disagreed, however, believing capital punishment to be
a deterrent, especially to those who were violent, and a group of chaplains
agreed. Nevertheless, testimony in support of deterrence of the death penalty
was largely limited to opinion rather than scientific fact.138
The Howard League, on the other hand, submitted a memorandum
analyzing the empirical effects of abolition on other countries. It showed that
there was no evidence that abolition did not result in an increase in murder,
nor that the restoration of the death penalty had ever resulted in a decrease.139
While the Commission did not ultimately recommend abolition,
the Commission did marshal together “an impressive array of evidence
against the death penalty” that supported “significant doubts about its
deterrence.”140 After wading through mounds of statistical evidence, the
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report stated that the uniquely deterrent force of the death penalty was likely
“exaggerated,” and that it is “important […] not to base a penal policy in
relation to murder on exaggerated estimates of the uniquely deterrent force
of the death penalty.”141
While the British movement against capital punishment was always
“basically a humanitarian campaign,” at this point it had become “modern
and scientific,” relying on sociology and psychology to scrutinize the
efficacy and legitimacy of capital punishment in the United Kingdom.142 This
gave abolitionists a strong new leg on which to stand. Although they had
classically been limited to “moral and humanitarian bases” of arguments in
the earlier decade, they could now “prove objectively and scientifically that
the abolition of capital punishment would be advantageous to the nation.”143
While the Commission was holding its sessions on capital
punishment, three very controversial, and very public, capital cases were
held and tried by the Government.144 The first of these three was the trial
of Timothy Evans. Evans was accused in 1950 of murdering his wife and
daughter and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. During
the course of his trial, Evans had accused John Christie, his upstairs neighbor,
of being responsible for the two murders. Evans was hanged in March of that
year. Three years after Evans’ trial, Christie was discovered to be a serial
killer, responsible for murdering several women at his property, including
his own wife, consequently raising serious doubt about Evans’ conviction.145
The second of these cases was the trial of Derek Bentley in 1952.
Bentley, a nineteen-year-old boy, was accused and convicted of the murder
of Police Constable Sidney Miles, who was shot and killed during a burglary
attempt carried out by Bentley and his accomplice Christopher Craig. Bentley
was sentenced to death despite the fact that Craig had been the one to actually
shoot PC Miles and despite the fact that Bentley had been in police custody
at the time of the killing.146 Craig did not receive the death penalty, as he
was only sixteen years old and therefore underage. During the course of the
investigation, a psychiatrist had also concluded that Bentley appeared to be
borderline retarded.147
The third case to spark public interest in abolition was the trial of Ruth
Ellis in 1955. 28-year-old Ellis was executed for the murder of her unfaithful
lover, David Blakely, having shot him with four bullets outside a pub on
Easter Sunday, and thereby committing what other countries would have
deemed a crime passionel.148 Ellis was the last woman executed in Britain
and one of the few women to be subjected to the penalty in all of twentieth
century England. While there was no doubt regarding Ellis’ guilt, there was
doubt about her state of mind and doubt about the appropriateness of her
sentence, especially given the commonplace of reprieves at the time.149
The public’s reaction to these three cases was both large and
vociferous. All three had been generally perceived to be “miscarriages
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of justice.”150 In the weeks before Bentley was executed, his case became a
“cause célèbre” amongst the British people. In stark contrast to England’s
older public executions, on the night before the Bentley execution, over three
hundred people gathered to protest his sentence.151 In support of granting
reprieve to Ellis, numerous petitions were submitted to the Home Office, some
containing thousands of signatures. She garnered a great deal of sympathy
because of her young age, her children, the impulsive and passionate nature
of the murder she committed, and the fact that she was an attractive blonde
woman.152 Evans’ case saw the most backlash, although it only occurred
posthumously. The likelihood of his innocence prompted even Parliament to
mention the issue and criticize the Home Office in the mid-1950s.153
By 1956, there was increasing pressure from the public, from the
release of the report by the Royal Commission, and from various abolitionists
in Parliament, for a new debate on capital punishment. The abolition of the
death penalty had “developed into a leading issue on the British scene,” and
in that summer, the House of Commons debated and voted on the Death
Penalty (Abolition) Bill, introduced by Sydney Silverman the year prior.154
The Howard League and the National Campaign for the Abolition
of Capital Punishment helped link the public’s newfound interest in capital
punishment with the dealings of Parliament. The groups were well suited for
this. The Howard League was an organization that “enjoyed a close working
relationship with the Home Office.”155 The NCACP was partly founded by
Silverman himself, and assisted in the abolitionist effort by initiating an
“intensive drive for abolition” in the same year.156 The NCACP organization
soon had over 20,000 members.157
The NCACP was led by Gerland Gardiner, a prominent barrister, and
Victor Gollancz, a publisher and charismatic activist.158 It was the occupation
of the latter that allowed the NCACP to substantially affect the public
atmosphere surrounding capital punishment. Alongside public meetings in
many important cities in Britain, the organization published several pieces of
literature, spurring public interest in abolition, based on both emotional and
scientific appeals.159
The mass of literature included Gollancz’ own Capital Punishment:
The Heart of the Matter and Arthur Koestler’s Reflections on Hanging.
Both works were passionate polemics against capital punishment that
based themselves on moral arguments. As Gollancz succinctly stated in his
work: “Capital punishment is wrong and that is all there is to it.”160 Koestler
similarly focused on the art of polemic, but also wrote detailed the experience
of other abolitionist countries, as well as delving into the emotional and
personal aspects of a series of murders in Britain, all in an effort to disprove
the alleged deterrence of the death penalty.161 The NCACP also connected
abolitionist members of Parliament with the public, allowing both Sydney
Silverman and Reginald Paget the ability to publish pamphlets as part of the
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NCACP’s efforts. Their works included Hanged and Innocent?, a short book
identifying several miscarriages of justice in the practice of the death penalty,
including the execution of Timothy Evans.
Debate on the Abolition Bill did not ignore the rapid changes in
public interest, although Parliament was unsure how to deal with it. While
Montgomery Hyde noted that public opinion was changing in support of
abolition,162 Sir Robert Grimston argued that the public had been exposed to
misleading propaganda.163 By 1956, 45 percent of the public disapproved of
a trial suspension of capital punishment -- 24 percentage points lower than
recent years past.164
Nevertheless, debate over Silverman’s bill did not see any new
arguments that had not already been mentioned in the Parliamentary
discourse. Abolitionists continued to argue that capital punishment was not
uniquely a deterrent, while retentionists saw it as necessary to keep homicide
rates low.165 The abolitionists in Commons were victorious again, with a vote
of 286 to 262.166
The Bill was then passed along to the House of Lords, where debate
opened on July 9. While several Lords voiced their opinions in favor of
abolition (in fact “nearly twice as large as had been expected”),167 the bill was
“thoroughly trounced” with a vote of 238 to 95.168 At the center of the Lords
debate was whether capital punishment was a uniquely effective deterrent,
greater than life imprisonment.169 While Viscount Templewood cited the
Royal Commission’s inability to find sufficient evidence of such a notion,
MPs like the Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir170 and Viscount Malvern171
expressed their wholehearted opinion that capital punishment served as a
deterring force in the United Kingdom.
Although the Government and the House of Lords stood strong
against abolition, they could not ignore the constant pressure arising out
of the House of Commons on the subject. The Cabinet was faced with a
dilemma: it did not favor the complete abolition of capital punishment, but
it recognized that there was a large demand from Commons for the practice
to be reformed. The Cabinet wrestled with the question of deterrence. While
they admitted that many other countries had abolished capital punishment
without effect, they did not see Britain as civilized enough to deal with its
abolition. The Cabinet was certain that Britain, as a unique society, would
see a disastrous rise in homicide rates if capital punishment were done away
with.172
A compromise seemed on the horizon, and it came in the form of
the 1957 Homicide Bill, introduced by Home Secretary Lloyd George in
November of 1956. The Home Secretary had personally recommended that
capital punishment not be abolished173 and the Government justified the
bill’s support by noting, “public opinion desired a compromise and did not
want total abolition.”174 The bill, however, did not modify the death penalty
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per se.of justice.”150 In the weeks before Bentley was executed, his case
became a “cause célèbre” amongst the British people. In stark contrast to
England’s older public executions, on the night before the Bentley execution,
over three hundred people gathered to protest his sentence.151 In support of
granting reprieve to Ellis, numerous petitions were submitted to the Home
Office, some containing thousands of signatures. She garnered a great deal
of sympathy because of her young age, her children, the impulsive and
passionate nature of the murder she committed, and the fact that she was
an attractive blonde woman.152 Evans’ case saw the most backlash, although
it only occurred posthumously. The likelihood of his innocence prompted
even Parliament to mention the issue and criticize the Home Office in the
mid-1950s.153
By 1956, there was increasing pressure from the public, from the
release of the report by the Royal Commission, and from various abolitionists
in Parliament, for a new debate on capital punishment. The abolition of the
death penalty had “developed into a leading issue on the British scene,” and
in that summer, the House of Commons debated and voted on the Death
Penalty (Abolition) Bill, introduced by Sydney Silverman the year prior.154
The Howard League and the National Campaign for the Abolition
of Capital Punishment helped link the public’s newfound interest in capital
punishment with the dealings of Parliament. The groups were well suited for
this. The Howard League was an organization that “enjoyed a close working
relationship with the Home Office.”155 The NCACP was partly founded by
Silverman himself, and assisted in the abolitionist effort by initiating an
“intensive drive for abolition” in the same year.156 The NCACP organization
soon had over 20,000 members.157
The NCACP was led by Gerland Gardiner, a prominent barrister, and
Victor Gollancz, a publisher and charismatic activist.158 It was the occupation
of the latter that allowed the NCACP to substantially affect the public
atmosphere surrounding capital punishment. Alongside public meetings in
many important cities in Britain, the organization published several pieces of
literature, spurring public interest in abolition, based on both emotional and
scientific appeals.159
The mass of literature included Gollancz’ own Capital Punishment:
The Heart of the Matter and Arthur Koestler’s Reflections on Hanging.
Both works were passionate polemics against capital punishment that
based themselves on moral arguments. As Gollancz succinctly stated in his
work: “Capital punishment is wrong and that is all there is to it.”160 Koestler
similarly focused on the art of polemic, but also wrote detailed the experience
of other abolitionist countries, as well as delving into the emotional and
personal aspects of a series of murders in Britain, all in an effort to disprove
the alleged deterrence of the death penalty.161 The NCACP also connected
abolitionist members of Parliament with the public, allowing both Sydney
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Silverman and Reginald Paget the ability to publish pamphlets as part of the
NCACP’s efforts. Their works included Hanged and Innocent?, a short book
identifying several miscarriages of justice in the practice of the death penalty,
including the execution of Timothy Evans.
Debate on the Abolition Bill did not ignore the rapid changes in
public interest, although Parliament was unsure how to deal with it. While
Montgomery Hyde noted that public opinion was changing in support of
abolition,162 Sir Robert Grimston argued that the public had been exposed to
misleading propaganda.163 By 1956, 45 percent of the public disapproved of
a trial suspension of capital punishment -- 24 percentage points lower than
recent years past.164
Nevertheless, debate over Silverman’s bill did not see any new
arguments that had not already been mentioned in the Parliamentary
discourse. Abolitionists continued to argue that capital punishment was not
uniquely a deterrent, while retentionists saw it as necessary to keep homicide
rates low.165 The abolitionists in Commons were victorious again, with a vote
of 286 to 262.166
The Bill was then passed along to the House of Lords, where debate
opened on July 9. While several Lords voiced their opinions in favor of
abolition (in fact “nearly twice as large as had been expected”),167 the bill was
“thoroughly trounced” with a vote of 238 to 95.168 At the center of the Lords
debate was whether capital punishment was a uniquely effective deterrent,
greater than life imprisonment.169 While Viscount Templewood cited the
Royal Commission’s inability to find sufficient evidence of such a notion,
MPs like the Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir170 and Viscount Malvern171
expressed their wholehearted opinion that capital punishment served as a
deterring force in the United Kingdom.
Although the Government and the House of Lords stood strong
against abolition, they could not ignore the constant pressure arising out
of the House of Commons on the subject. The Cabinet was faced with a
dilemma: it did not favor the complete abolition of capital punishment, but
it recognized that there was a large demand from Commons for the practice
to be reformed. The Cabinet wrestled with the question of deterrence. While
they admitted that many other countries had abolished capital punishment
without effect, they did not see Britain as civilized enough to deal with its
abolition. The Cabinet was certain that Britain, as a unique society, would
see a disastrous rise in homicide rates if capital punishment were done away
with.172
A compromise seemed on the horizon, and it came in the form of
the 1957 Homicide Bill, introduced by Home Secretary Lloyd George in
November of 1956. The Home Secretary had personally recommended that
capital punishment not be abolished173 and the Government justified the bill’s
support by noting, “public opinion desired a compromise and did not want
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total abolition.”174 The bill, however, did not modify the death penalty per se.
Rather, it modified the law of murder. It sought, amongst other pursuits, to
amend the law by creating categories of capital and non-capital murders.175
The Government, exploiting its majority in the House of Lords, passed the
bill quickly through committee without amendment, and through the Lords
unaltered. The Homicide Bill became law in March.176
The 1960s: Culmination
The movement towards abolition, meanwhile, quickened its pace
as it became readily apparent that the Homicide Bill of 1957 was illogical
and flawed. More members of Parliament disregarded public opinion, of
which a majority still favored retention, in the 1960s, and by the government,
though hardline retentionists still relied on it heavily. By the time Sydney
Silverman introduced a new abolition bill in 1965, nearly all obstacles for
the abolitionists were gone, paving the road for the final riddance of the
death penalty in Britain. And while the Parliamentary debates in the 1960s
regarding the abolition of capital punishment offered few new arguments
that differed from those in the 1940s and 1950s, the debate did become even
more centralized on the issue of deterrence.
By the beginning of the decade, the 1957 Homicide Bill was proving
to be a disaster. Ironically, the failure of the bill, which was meant by the
Government as a concession to abolitionists, strengthened the case against
the death penalty. Its underlying reasoning was that some murders required
the death penalty while others did not, a move that the Royal Commission
had explicitly warned against.177 While, for instance, a farmer who shot his
wife would be executed, a farmer who had bludgeoned his wife to death
with a shotgun would not. While a thief who accidently killed a person when
startled would be hanged, a man who thoughtfully carried out a plan to
poison would not.178
Many abolitionists were against the bill from its inception. Hugh
Klare, general secretary of the Howard League, thought the bill to be
“illogical.”179 Ironically, abolitionists were assisted by the bill’s consequences,
especially in regard to the issue of deterrence. After the bill was passed, the
proportion of capital murders increased while the proportion of non-capital
murders decreased, the exact opposite of what proponents of the death
penalty as a deterrent predicted.180
Even the Government, in its own inter-office communications,
recognized that “there [was] a growing recognition that the Homicide
Act of 1957 was a mistake” but that “this cannot be said publicly until
the Government is prepared to propose an alternative.”181 Richard Butler,
Secretary of State for the Home Office, stated in a memorandum that because
of the Homicide Bill he was “under considerable pressure to do something
about capital punishment” and expected “increasing criticism of [his]
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decisions in individual cases, and increasing Parliamentary pressure for
debates about them.”182
This pressure was a result of the religious and political elites turning
against the death penalty in Britain. In the space less than of a decade, the
Church of England had completely reversed its attitude towards capital
punishment -- a “complete revolution.”183 Some members of the clergy, like
the Reverend F. P. Coleman, even made motions in Parliament against the
death penalty. Bishop Mortimer of Exeter pressed the House of Lords for
abolition. Many clergymen also started giving speeches against the morality
of capital punishment. As the religious elite turned against the death penalty,
many of their followers did as well.184
The public outcry over the recent controversial capital cases had
not left Britain’s conscience. While the majority of the British public still
supported the institution of capital punishment, by about a three-to-one
ratio, that support had fallen substantially from previous years.185 The cases
had damaged the public image of the practice. Almost all those who had
“recently made up their mind against capital punishment” said that a “major
factor” in their decision were “recent hanging cases.”186 In the elite and
educated circles especially, the cases had served as another nail in the coffin
of the death penalty.
By 1965, abolition seemed inevitable, and in the November of that
year, despite public opinion and a rising crime rate, the political elite passed
the Murder Act.187 It suspended the death penalty in Britain for a period
of five years.188 Even the Government, who in the 1950s had held steadfast
against abolition, by 1964 saw abolition as inevitable.189
The debates of the political elite, continuing in Parliament, mirrored
the culmination of the various forces that emerged against the death penalty
in the 1950s. Often citing the results of the prior Royal Commission, members
of Parliament focused heavily on the issue of deterrence. Yet although there
were significantly fewer members defending capital punishment, the debate
still lasted for two days.
Sydney Silverman stood center stage once again, chastising the
failure of the 1957 Homicide Act, and stressing the irrelevance of public
opinion polls, which still showed a large majority against the abolition of the
death penalty.190 Both Houses significantly devalued the question of public
opinion. As Silverman asserted: “we do not govern ourselves in this country
by referendum.”191 It was readily apparent that Parliament would weight
polling data much less than had been considered in the late 1940s.
After Silverman’s speech, the retentionists in both Commons and
in Lords spoke overwhelmingly about deterrence. Lord Molson tried to
delegitimize the statistics disproving the deterrence of the death penalty,
arguing, “If I were subjected to a great temptation to commit murder, the
knowledge that the penalty was death would be a great help in resisting
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that temptation.”192 Lord Chuter-Ede retorted that it is “most unusual for any
crime of murder to have been long premeditated,” and thus such knowledge
would not be an efficient deterrent.193 The Earl of Haddington cited the
results of the Royal Commission to support the illegitimacy of the practice
of capital punishment.194 Similarly, the Lord Bishop of Chester cited the
testimony given by Professor Thorsten Sellin, a prominent sociologist at the
University of Pennsylvania, to the Royal Commission.195 The Commission
had asked Sellin if “capital punishment cannot, on the basis of your figures,
be exercising an overwhelming deterrent effect.”196 Sellin answered that his
data could not support the existence of such an effect.197 The Bishop also cited
the Evans case as a tragic miscarriage of justice.198
At the conclusion of the debates in Parliament, Commons voted 355
to 170199 to pass the bill, and Lords subsequently agreed by a vote of 204
to 104.200 A caveat was added to the bill throughout the process, however:
abolition would not necessarily be permanent, but would rather be placed
on a five-year ‘trial’ period.
While the Act was not debated until 1970, the Government, especially
the new home secretary James Callaghan, hinted that it was looking at
making abolition permanent the year prior.201 The most important part of the
‘trial period’ was a report being compiled by the Home Office Research Unit
on the facts and figures of the abolition experiment.202 This report, entitled
Murder 1957-1968, showed that murder rates had increased from 3.9 per
million in 1965 to 4.2 per million in 1968, but that this rate had been steadily
increasing from 1955 onwards, reinforcing the idea that murder rates were
disconnected from the state of capital punishment.203
The data were used to the abolitionists’ advantage. When the new
home secretary, James Callaghan, introduced a motion to make the Murder
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act of 1965 permanent,204 Gerald Gardiner, Lord
Chancellor, pointed out in the pursuant debate that the murder rate had not
significantly changed in the past ten years.205 But the House of Lords was not
the only arena in which such data were used. The Times, on December 15,
1969, ran a letter signed by 35 criminologists stating they felt “compelled to
point out that there is nowhere in any of the voluminous statistical material
about murder and the death penalty any conclusive evidence as to its special
deterrent value.”206
While public opinion stood strong against the permanent abolition
of capital punishment, at over 80 percent, Parliament largely ignored their
views.207 At the beginning of the debate on his motion, James Callaghan
stated that:
There are times when Parliament has to act in advance of public
opinion and give a lead. On penal questions it is not uncommonly
the case; Parliament has done it before and Parliament was not
wrong. Let us give a lead again today.”208
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Commons debated Callaghan’s motion for seven hours and carried it
343 to 185. In the Lords, it passed with a majority of 46.209 After two decades of
fervent debates, novel data collections, and complicated political movements,
Parliament had finally abolished capital punishment permanently.
Part III: The Influence of Entrepreneurial Elites and of Public Opinion
For the first half of the post-war period, policy in the United States
seemed to be on the same track towards an end of executions as found in
Great Britain. This section will, through both theoretical and comparative
analyses, explore some explanations of why the United States may have
diverged from that path towards permanent abolition, instead reinstating
and strengthening its institution of capital punishment.
One of the most commonly made arguments for the failure of
abolition in the United States and the success of abolition in England
attributes the disparity to the political elites of the United Kingdom, who
were less willing to bend to public opinion on the subject.210211 Consequently,
the first part two parts of this analysis will deal with elite actions and public
opinion. I will first weigh the influence of elite political entrepreneurs on the
development of capital punishment policy in the two countries. I will then
similarly analyze the influence of public opinion. In an effort to weigh the
influence of each of these I will try to ascertain the extent of their effects on:
(i)
The initial efforts for abolition
(ii)
The prioritization of abolition as a pressing concern for 		
		government
(iii)
The reversal of abolition in the United States
At the end of this section, I will advance again and defend the central point of
this paper: that the influence of a textual Constitution helped derail America
from its path towards abolition and instead re-entrenched the death penalty
by creating a new basis for its legitimation.
The Influence of Entrepreneurial Elites
Particular elite individuals in politics had strong influences on the
development of capital punishment policy in both the United States and
England. The narratives of both countries feature influential abolitionist
figures in government who worked in tandem, consciously or otherwise,
with interest groups advocating for abolition. These entrepreneurial elites
can explain why each country made an initial effort for abolition and also
why those efforts eventually gained enough traction to warrant serious
government attention. Nevertheless, while the actions of interested elites
may explain why abolition was initially introduced in each country, and why
it was important on each country’s governmental agenda, those influences
do not sufficiently explain why the United States made such a significant
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backtrack in the 1970s.
(i) The initial abolition efforts on the federal level in America and
in Britain were both sparked by interested ‘entrepreneurial’ politicians. In
America, and on the legislative front, Senators Morse and Hart introduced
and supported several bills in the early 1960s that took steps towards ending
capital punishment. Morse, whose home state of Oregon abolished the death
penalty by popular referendum in 1964, was a “relentless advocate for all
forms of Constitutional protection under the law,”212 and his stance against
the death penalty was no exception. Senator Hart, meanwhile, as chairman
of the congressional subcommittee of Criminal Laws and Procedures, held
numerous hearings on the death penalty, though few were consequential.213
Combined, Senators Morse and Hart were largely responsible for introducing
and focusing discussions in Congress on capital punishment -- discussions
that were very rare before the 1960s.
MP Sidney Silverman had a similar but much stronger effect in the
British legislature. He was vocal in all of the debates between 1947 and 1965,
often speaking first and framing the discussion in his own terms. Silverman
was, much like Morse, a relentless advocate for abolition, introducing
abolitionist measures in 1948, 1956, and 1965. But Silverman also took further
steps in his project than any similar American politician. He co-founded
and worked closely with the National Campaign for the Abolition of
Capital Punishment to create a link between the public and elite campaigns
for abolition. Kingdon214 would likely identify Silverman as a “policy
entrepreneur” for abolition because of his persistence and unconditional
attachment to the project. Although America had politicians who were very
interested in abolition like Senator Morse, none of these individuals persisted
as consistently and as strategically as Silverman in the United Kingdom.
The American narrative had a stronger figure, though, in its judiciary:
Justice Goldberg. Goldberg took the initiative to bring the capital punishment
debate into judicial grounds. He had recruited Alan Dershowitz as a clerk
in 1963, and had asked him on his first day to prepare a memorandum
that could find capital punishment to be “cruel and unusual” in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. Goldberg’s “extraordinary initiative” resulted
in a memorandum that was circulated around to the other justices had a
“bombshell effect” on the Court.215
Although the memorandum was not made available to the public
at the time, Goldberg would soon transplant its arguments into a dissenting
opinion that initiated the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund (LDF) to challenge
capital punishment through litigation. Goldberg had no explicit connection
with the LDF, like Silverman had with the NCACP. Even so, the dissenting
opinion he volunteered after Rudolph v. Alabama “awakened interest in the
constitutionality of capital punishment.”216 The ACLU also adopted a formal
position against the death penalty in 1965, as it had been “encouraged by the
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‘Goldberg signal.’”217
As evidenced by the narratives, the influences of political elite and
interest groups can therefore largely explain the initial abolition efforts in
both England and the United States. Silverman and the NCACP led the charge
for abolition in the former while Goldberg and his effectual connection to the
NAACP’s LDF led the charge in the latter.
(ii) The actions of elites can also explain why the abolition of capital
punishment was placed so prominently on both the British and American
government agendas.
While the United States had interested congressmen, like Senators
Morse and Hart, pushing for abolition, their efforts were largely unsuccessful
(though they did appear to be slowly gaining more traction). Before the
legislative actions in the United States could amount to significant legislation,
the judiciary, in 1968, took over the issue of capital punishment. Primed by
Goldberg’s dissent, the LDF put considerable pressure on the courts to make
a final decision on the constitutionality of capital punishment. The LDF
thereby directed significant judicial attention to the issue of abolition and
effectively drove it higher on the broader government’s agenda.
The LDF orchestrated a widely dispersed legal strategy in its efforts.
It reasoned that with a “campaign of test cases,” it could create a death row
“logjam,” pushing the judiciary to favor abolition.218 In 1967, with money
granted from the Ford Foundation to fight for the rights of the indigent,
the LDF provided assistance to over fifty men and created a “Last Aid
Kit,” circulating it around to overburdened public defenders and criminal
lawyers.219 The “Last Aid Kit” was a toolkit for capital punishment cases.
It contained drafts of petitions for habeas corpus, applications for stays of
execution, and legal briefs that put forth every significant constitutional
argument against the death penalty.220 By making its arguments and influence
available to all death row inmates, the LDF put pressure on the America
judiciary from many sides to do something about the constitutionality of
capital punishment.
In England, the efforts of Silverman and the NCACP heightened the
awareness of the issues concerning capital punishment in both the public and
in Parliament, effectively placing abolition high on the political agenda. The
relationship between Silverman and the NCACP forged a wider collaborative
effort between abolitionist MPs and community activists to increase social
awareness of the death penalty and its ills.
The political abolitionist elite in England engaged in a widespread
drive of persuasion. This approach differed from the litigation strategy in
America, where such efforts were not thought to be necessary in order to
push the Supreme Court to find capital punishment unconstitutional. The
NCACP, with its publications, town meetings, and community activism,
likely increased the importance of capital punishment in the public sphere.
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Gallup suddenly started asking the public questions about capital punishment
much more often in the early 1950s.221 While it is unclear whether or not the
publication and propaganda efforts by the NCACP and the political elite
had a large effect in swaying the public towards abolition, especially since
public opinion never turned predominantly against the death penalty, it
likely helped to develop capital punishment into a “leading issue” by 1960.222
Moreover, Silverman’s “entrepreneurial” activities allowed him to take
advantage of this change as a “policy window”223 of opportunity in order to
push the issue of abolition to the upper ranks of Parliament’s agenda.
(iii) The motivations and activities of the political elite cannot,
however, explain the backtrack by the United States from abolition in the
1970s. No remarkably influential elite figures, nor significantly organized
interest groups, led the charge against abolition between Furman and Gregg.
Gottschalk224 writes that there was no “grand mobilization by interest groups
to change the context of litigation” on capital punishment. She also observes
that Furman, for instance, “did not ignite conservative groups to fight for the
death penalty with the same intensity they mobilized against abortion after
Roe v. Wade.”225
Admittedly, there were some prominent elite figures in American
politics that came out in support of the death penalty before the Gregg
decision. New York City Mayor Ed Koch, for instance, declared his support
for the death penalty by saying that, “when the killer lives, the victim dies
twice.”226
The pleas of elite American retentionists, however, were not much
different from those of some political elites in England who similarly came
out in support of capital punishment during its moratorium. MP Duncan
Sandys, for example, collected over 800,000 signatures for a petition submitted
to Parliament, calling for the revocation of abolition. Sandys also recruited a
number of small elite conservative groups to call for the reinstatement of
capital punishment.227 Their efforts were unsuccessful.
In America, such interest groups did not organize elite retentionist
opinion. Instead, collective reactions to the moratorium came mainly from
some state legislatures. These legislatures signaled their distaste with the
Court’s decision by passing laws to circumvent the Furman decision and
reinstate capital punishment.
The Influence of Public Opinion
There are strong similarities in the public opinion of capital
punishment between England and America in the period of 1940-1975. Both
were strongly against the abolition of the death penalty, and both deviated
only slightly from this position throughout the course of the abolitionist
narratives. Although public opinion itself cannot explain the initial abolition
efforts in either country, which were mostly elite movements, this section
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will explore its influence on agenda-setting in England and its influence in
the American backtrack on abolition in the 1970s. This section will conclude
that public opinion cannot by itself explain the American reneging of the
abolition of capital punishment.
(i) The force of public opinion alone cannot explain initial abolition
efforts in either country. Most Americans and British always favored the
retention of capital punishment. Nevertheless, changes in public opinion
may have their own effects on political decisions. This was not the case in
England, however. Silverman’s initial attempts to abolish capital punishment
in the late 1940s predated the minor shift in public attitudes towards abolition
in the 1950s. Moreover, this change was not very significant, and indeed may
well have helped spark it.
In the United States, changes in public opinion did coincide with
initial efforts for abolition, both in the legislatures and in the judiciary; but
it is unlikely that these changes can explain those initial efforts for several
reasons. First, as in Britain, the abolitionist population in the United States
was never large enough to mount a significant majority, and thus never large
enough to create a strong voting bloc to sway elite opinion to pursue abolition.
Moreover, abolition of the death penalty was never a politically fruitful
endeavor for a politician to initiate.228 Judicial entrepreneurs for abolition,
like Justice Goldberg, and the interest groups that pursued abolition in the
courts, like the LDF, were isolated from the consequences of the electorate’s
opinion.
(ii) Public opinion also had little to no role in the United States in
pushing abolition up on the government agenda. While public support for
the death penalty was falling to new lows in the United States during the
early 1960s, there was also no concerted effort from the public to consider the
abolition of capital punishment on any foreseeably short timetable, at least
on the federal level. This is not surprising since the prioritization of capital
punishment occurred largely because of the legal assault of the LDF in the
courts, a realm generally sectioned off from public attitudes.
In England, however, the influence of public opinion on the
government agenda is more complex. Parliament wrestled with how to
deal with public attitudes towards capital punishment from 1948 onwards.
Despite the conclusions of Gottschalk229 and Garland230, I do not believe that
Parliament was isolated in its decision-making on the death penalty from the
demands of public opinion. This is evidenced in the Parliamentary records
that I have reviewed: nearly all debates over capital punishment between
1948-1969 frequently brought up the question of public opinion.
It is interesting, first, to note that Silverman in 1948 made arguments
expressly for why public opinion should be taken into account in decisions
over the death penalty. But Silverman did not see raw poll data as a legitimate
representation of “public opinion.” He believed it lay in the opinion of the
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House of Commons, which provided an educated “cross section of the mind
of the community.”231
As public opinion, or at least poll data, began to trend toward larger
support for abolition in the 1950s, abolitionists began to rely on it more
frequently. MP Montgomery Hyde had argued that the changes public opinion
towards abolition was a justification for ending capital punishment.232 The
Government justified the middle-of-the-road 1957 Homicide Act by noting
that public opinion was still mixed over abolition, and still predominantly
opposed.233 The Government inferred that this meant the public was calling
for a “compromise.”234
By the 1960s, public opinion had halted and reversed its momentum,
growing more in favor of retention. In the 1965 debates, Lord Alpert, a
retentionist, stressed that public opinion was “of great importance” and
“must not be ignored.”235 Lord Ferrier similarly stressed the “dangers” of
acting incongruently with public opinion.236
Parliament and its members did not invoke public opinion
consistently. While abolitionists justified arguments using its trends in the
1950s, they rallied against using public opinion when trends reversed in the
1960s. Members of Parliament clearly seemed to only rely on public opinion
when current trends appeared to justify their pre-existing preferences on the
death penalty. Likely because of this common strategy, public opinion in
and of itself was rather ineffectual in driving the government agenda in one
particular way.
Nevertheless, the public had been significantly shocked by the
cases of Bentley, Evans, and Ellis, had been subject to the NCACP and its
proliferation of abolitionist literature, and had also read of the results of the
1953 Royal Commission’s report in various national newspapers. In light of
these facts, it is not particularly contentious to assert that capital punishment
had risen much higher on the national agenda and in the public consciousness
during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Public opinion, as an aggregation
of pre-existing preferences, likely did not have a substantial effect on the
government agenda, but its vocal abolitionist sector did participate in raising
national awareness on the subject.
(iii) The influence of public opinion on the reneging of American
abolition is also complex. Public opinion was cited as central in the majority
opinion of Gregg, which looked “to objective indicia that reflect[ed] the
public attitude.”237 Meanwhile, the public had in some ways made attempts
to overturn moratoria. California, for instance, overturned its own Supreme
Court’s declaration of the death penalty as unconstitutional in early 1972
(before Furman) by a referendum amending the state constitution.238 Within
two years of Furman twenty-eight state legislatures had passed laws to
reinstate the death penalty, modifying it to meet the Court’s requirements.239
Nonetheless, as the Court is generally isolated from public opinion,
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it was at the Court’s discretion that the public and the legislatures were
allowed to have such an effect. The Supreme Court decided to incorporate
the statistics of public opinion, and decided to make public attitudes central
in the reasoning of Gregg. The Court could have just as easily halted all
public attempts to end the moratorium; yet it did not take such a position.
England had similar, and in fact greater, public opposition to
abolition, especially after the passage of the Murder Bill of 1965, yet its
government did not take that opposition seriously and did not overturn
its original abolition. It is unlikely, however, that this is merely because
Parliament simply ignored public opinion. Retentionists in Parliament
brought up the public’s overwhelming stance against abolition frequently
when the question of reinstatement was on the table in 1969.
In fact, since the American moratorium was imposed outside of the
representative branches of the federal government, one would think it more
intuitive that America would have been less likely to renege on abolition
than its British counterpart, which passed abolition through the legislature
and in fact had higher rates of public support for the death penalty. It is
unlikely, therefore, the public opinion itself had much effect on reinstating
the death penalty in the United States.
Let us briefly then review the conclusions of this section. We have
an explanation of how initial abolition efforts came about in both countries:
they came from interested elites with the ability to create political and
legal pressures in government. We have an explanation of why abolition
was transformed into a priority issue: again these came largely from elite
pressures, although abolition efforts in England were likely helped to a small
degree by the national atmosphere, ignited by current events. We also have
a very partial explanation of why America may have reneged on its abolition
of capital punishment, namely some sort of a disorganized combination of
elite and public opposition. Yet this explanation is not very tenable, because
England faced parallel types of pressure after abolition and nonetheless held
strong onto abolition.
Part IV: The Influence of the Ambiguously Written American Constitution
This section will pursue how the influence of the textual Constitution
may fill in the gaps of the previous explanations, specifically in regard to
the reinstatement and expansion of the death penalty in the United States.
I will pursue two main analyses that suggest that the existence of a textual
document, the Constitution, may have contributed to America’s deviation
from the path on which it was traveling with Britain towards permanent
abolition. The first analysis (Part A) will review the historical effect of the
ambiguously written Constitution on the shift in legislative and public
debates away from issues of deterrence and morality. This will directly lead
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into the second analysis (Part B), which will argue that a debate around the
ambiguous textual phrase “cruel and unusual” tended towards affirming
the general majority retentionist attitudes regarding capital punishment and
thereby created a new legitimation for the practice.
Framing the Debate
The early legislative debates surrounding capital punishment in
England and America were remarkably similar, despite the fact that they
occurred on slightly different timescales. The modern abolition movement in
Britain lasted from 1948 to 1969. The parallel movement in the United States
lasted from the early 1960s to 1976. The question of whether or not the death
penalty was a unique deterrent lay at the center of both during their early
phases. Retentionists and abolitionists alike relied on their respective views
on deterrence in both countries in the justification of their positions.
The centrality of deterrence in the debate over abolition is evidenced
by the British move to convene a Royal Commission in 1949 tasked with
investigating the issue. The results of the Commission would prove fruitful
for the abolitionists, and the debate in England never wavered from the
frame of deterrence. Abolitionists, in other words, were able to ground the
debate in a frame that, in light of empirical evidence, proved to be in favor of
their side. The British retentionists were not successful in moving the debate
to a different arena, nor were such efforts very pronounced.
In the early 1960s, the American abolitionist congressmen did not
pursue a different path than their English counterparts. These politicians,
too, attempted to use the published data of criminologists, sociologists, and
psychologists to prove that the death penalty was not a deterrent. The results
of the 1953 Royal Commission even reverberated in the halls of the Capitol.
Representative Multer submitted into the congressional record, alongside
six other statements, the results of the Commission, all in an effort to prove
that the death penalty did not deter people from committing crimes. The
two countries, in their debates over capital punishment, were very parallel
during the period immediately after their abolitionist measures began.
But there was a clear divergence between the two countries when
the Constitution became involved. The LDF began its assault against capital
punishment in the judiciary by the late 1960s. In 1968, the first Supreme
Court decision regarding the issue, Witherspoon v. Illinois, announced to the
country that the Court was willing to criticize the longstanding institution of
capital punishment in America.
Almost immediately, Congress responded to the Court’s signal.
While prior to 1967 there were no mentions of the “unconstitutionality” of
the death penalty in the congressional records, as the Supreme Court became
more interested in the constitutionality of the death penalty, debates in
Congress began to preemptively address the issue. By 1971, Congress was
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discussing whether or not capital punishment could be understood as “cruel
and unusual punishment” and Senator Hart attempted to convince Congress
that it should rule that it was.240 While he and others still referenced the ideas
of deterrence, as before, the way in which deterrence was incorporated into
these debates had changed. For instance, Hart’s introduction of the Death
Penalty Suspension Act (S. 1969) adapted his deterrence argument into an
argument that the death penalty was “cruel.”241 Debate increasingly involved
a question of whether or not any failure of the death penalty to deter counted
as an adequate explanation for why it was “cruel,” rather than whether or
not the punishment truly did deter.
England, at the mid-way point in its abolition narrative, had
intensified its debate over deterrence. Armed with the results of the Royal
Commission’s report, abolitionists seemed to fall on the winning side of
the Parliamentary discussions. Without the question of constitutionality,
retentionists had few arguments to draw upon to support the protection
of the death penalty, and were, despite the recent data, boxed into merely
repeating their beliefs that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent. In light
of the 1953 Royal Commission report, this maneuver was destined to fail.
The English focus on deterrence meant whichever side could marshal more
objective fact on their side was more likely to succeed.
Yet such debate still took time -- in England there stood over twenty
years between Silverman’s initial efforts and final abolition. In America,
the courts took over the issue before less than a decade of congressional
debate. Moreover, debate lulled after the judicial involvement became more
pronounced. As Representative Kastenmeier noted, there was a “growing
but unofficial consensus that [questioning capital punishment] ought not
to be done […] until final Supreme Court decision of all the constitutional
issues.”242
After the Court’s decision in Furman, the judiciary’s rulings had
an even more pronounced effect on legislative debates, as congressmen
attempted to read the decision and the Constitution in the manner that
helped them the most. The phrase “cruel and unusual” became more central
to the debate, for it was the judiciary’s deciding factor of whether or not the
death penalty was constitutional.
Additionally, the phrase introduced ambiguity into the debate.
While the English discussions had revolved around a subject that was open
to empirical measurement (i.e. the deterring effect of the death penalty), the
American focus on “cruel and unusual” did not. As Caleb Foote observed
seven years before Furman, the Eighth Amendment “represent[ed] some of
the most ambiguous language in the Bill of Rights.”243
Cruel and Unusual: Interpretive Judgments vs. Social Science
The debate in America then became not one oriented towards
146

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Avinash Samarth
discovering social scientific evidence of objective behavioral patterns, as had
been the case in England, but one oriented towards textual interpretation.
While debates over more objective domains gravitate towards claims that
can be empirically supported, debates involving interpretation are more
muddied and unpredictable. In an attempt to analytically understand the
complex dynamics that resulted in the reinstatement of the death penalty
in America, I draw upon theories of philosophical hermeneutics and intersubjective communication. I first apply such theories to the notion of
‘interpreting’ the Constitution. I then look at, and discuss the significance
of, the discursive interaction between the Supreme Court and various
legislatures, both state and federal. I cast this interaction as inter-subjective
communication and argue that it dialogically forged a meaning of “cruel
and unusual” that played into the majority’s default opinion of capital
punishment. I lastly compare this analysis to the English experience. In this
section, I aim to conclude that the influence of the textual Constitution’s
written normative standards helped re-establish the American death penalty
by dialogically constructing a meaning for the Eighth Amendment that
justified the punishment and created new legitimation for its persistence.
Philosophical hermeneutics is indispensable to this discussion. It aims
to account for what happens to us as we go about understanding the world,
and it derives its basis from how we interpret texts. The constitutionality
of capital punishment, of course, explicitly regarded whether or not the
death penalty was, as per the text of the Constitution, “cruel and unusual
punishment.” Rather, though, than pursuing the debate over normative
hermeneutics, theories about the ‘correct’ way to apply some authoritative
text to a decision,244 I here instead attempt to use hermeneutics descriptively.
In other words, I seek to describe how the acts of interpreting the Eighth
Amendment themselves led to the “entrenching of the death penalty.”245
Hermeneutics scholar Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Truth and Method,246
provided an influential account of how we approach and come to understand
the meanings of texts. He noted that his objective was to identify “not what
we do or what we ought to do [in interpretation], but what happens to us
over and above our wanting and doing.”247 Gadamer argues that a ‘reader’ is
always necessarily situated in some sort of “tradition,” a position that creates
for him a “historically effected consciousness.”248 The “prejudices” that result
from this embeddedness interact as if in dialogue with the text, expanding or
moving the “horizons” that limit one’s understanding from one’s particular
vantage point.249 Interpreting a text, in other words, involves a “fusion” of
these horizons.250
As the American debate over abolition shifted towards issues of
constitutionality, ‘readers’ of the Constitution (i.e. justices, congressmen)
engaged in this process of interpretation, or in the “fusion of horizons.” In
all such practices, they ‘read’ from a position of “communal tradition and
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individual prejudices.”251
Interpreting the Constitution on the issue of capital punishment
was complex, however. Gadamer may well have summarized the tension
that existed between modern abolition efforts and the Constitution when he
wrote that:
In […] legal […] hermeneutics there is the essential tension between the
text set down […] on the one hand, and on the other, the sense arrived at
by its application in the particular moment of interpretation.”252
When thinking of interpretations of the Constitution as involving such a
tension, it is unsurprising that Furman produced such a “badly splintered
Court.”253 Given the infamous ambiguity of the Eighth Amendment, and
the relative lack of textual precedent explaining “cruel and unusual” at
the time, the clause held an open world of meaning to be read. It had, in a
sense, a vaguely defined background itself, and was therefore amenable to a
variety of resultant understandings. It was only likely that the distribution of
opinions would have been so dispersed.
But how then can we describe the subsequent convergence of
Gregg? To pursue such an answer we also consider that ‘readers’ of the
Constitution are not only engaging dialogically with its text, but are also
engaging dialogically with other readers. We must investigate, as Vogel254
writes, the “constitutional conversation that goes far beyond the technical
legal discourse of judges and lawyers.” In a way, the Supreme Court, the
Congress, and various state legislatures all “talked” to each other between
1972 and 1976 regarding interpretations of “cruel and unusual.” The medium
of this communication came in the form of Court opinions and legislative
responses (i.e. bills, acts, and laws). The preceding analysis focused on
isolated readers interpreting the Constitution. The subsequent analysis looks
at the interactions of those interpretations in the public sphere.
Specifically, I argue that through this communication a meaning
of “cruel and unusual” was dialogically forged. Habermas255 notes that
the purpose of inter-subjective communication in the public sphere is the
reaching, or forging, of a shared understanding. Gadamer’s hermeneutics
similarly “insist[…] on the cultivation of shared meanings and a shared
public space as a premise of interpretive praxis.”256
The shared meaning of “cruel and unusual” that led to interpretive
consensus came about from inter-subjective communication between the
Supreme Court, Congress, and various state legislatures. After the Furman
decision was handed down, Congress engaged in debate over its meaning.
In attempting to pass new legislation to meet the requirements of Furman,
Senators Eckhardt and Hruska noted that its definition hinged upon how
each Justice had interpreted the Constitution. Eckhardt attempted to identify
common currents underneath the Justices’ reasoning. He noted that if the
standards of the ‘swing’ Justices were met, then capital punishmentwould not
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be “cruel and unusual.” By way of this reasoning, Eckhardt was dialogically
engaging the Court in crafting a shared meaning of “cruel and unusual.”257
Similarly, the Supreme Court, in its majority opinion in Gregg, ‘read’
into the various legislative responses to Furman. In Gregg the Court assumed
that the Eighth Amendment and “evolving standards of decency” necessarily
referred to public opinion.258 Thirty-five state legislatures, as well as Congress,
had passed laws introducing a modified practice of the death penalty after
Furman, and the Court paid attention to these actions in Gregg.259 These
laws essentially represented the collective opinion of each legislature as to
the definition of “cruel and usual” -- they were communicative acts. Because
the bills were passed, they were thus statements from each legislature about
its interpretation of “cruel and unusual.” Specifically, they asserted that the
specific practices they laid out were not “cruel and unusual.” Through this
to-and-fro discussion, the Supreme Court and the legislatures conjointly
built up a common understanding of the meaning of the phrase “cruel and
unusual.”
This dynamic, however, played into the interests of the retentionists
since they represented the political majority. Critical Legal Studies scholars
argue that the reading of the Constitution and constitutional cases “consists
of political choice.”260 The most extreme forms of this critique claim that
‘readers’ of the Constitution merely impose “their private value judgments
on [its] text.”261 Despite the extremity of this position, it is consistent with
the events seen in the reverberations of the Furman decision in Congress.
While abolitionist congressmen claimed that Brennan and Marshall were
correct in Furman, retentionist congressmen aligned with Douglas, White,
and Stevens. Moreover, as legislative debate over capital punishment had
been essentially suspended after the Court had become involved, Congress
was still mostly retentionist. While Representative Fletcher Thompson (RGA), eight years before Gregg, had voiced his concern that the Supreme
Court would “allow the minority to control the majority,” and impose “upon
this entire nation and all the courts thereof the minority views of those who
oppose capital punishment,”262 it appears that the Court did just the opposite,
working together with the majority to reify its opinion as constitutional truth.
Moreover, the Court also verified that the legislatures had not affronted
the national opinion in its legislative responses to Furman. The Court, for
example, invalidated the mandatory death sentencing laws that were passed,
arguing that they were “repudiated” by societal standards.263 In total, these
communications resulted in a textual meaning that was fixed via the weaving
of a “social fabric of understanding.”264
We may again juxtapose this sequence of events against the
English experience. While the English also discussed and debated capital
punishment, the domain of their discussion was significantly different. The
English narrative centered on the issue of deterrence, a rational-scientific
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topic, while the American narrative pursued the meaning of a textual phrase
focused on more normative terms. In other words, the knowledge that the
American debate eventually pursued became essentially different than the
knowledge pursued by the English debates.
Habermas265 characterizes forms of knowledge by the interests that
drive them. Each form of knowledge has a corresponding organized mode of
inquiry and methodology of production. For instance, Habermas contrasts
the empirical-analytical sciences, based in a technical interest to predict and
control the natural environment, with the cultural-hermeneutic sciences,
interpretive modes of inquiry that derive from a practical interest to come
to mutual understandings between social actors. In the case of the capital
punishment debates, England pursued an empirical-analytical knowledge,
that is, the question of whether or not capital punishment is effective as a
deterrent against crime. This type of knowledge was obtainable through
social scientific searches for measurable behavior patterns. The United
States, on the other hand, pursued a hermeneutic knowledge, a shared and
mutual understanding as to the meaning of “cruel and unusual.” From this
characterization, we notice the much greater social nature of the American
contention regarding capital punishment as compared to the British. While
the debate in England sought more empirically based evidence of behavioral
patterns, the American debate focused on socially constructing normative
understandings.
The effect of this social construction was to re-legitimate the death
penalty in the United States. This line of events lies in stark contrast to
the United Kingdom, which had no opportunities in its 1969 debates over
reinstating capital punishment to do the same. The turn in debates towards
the ambiguously written Constitution uniquely pushed the United States
towards a re-entrenchment of the practice of capital punishment.
Steiker and Steiker266 assert that the Gregg decision “legitimated” the
practice of capital punishment. They argue, drawing on the work of Max
Weber, that the decision proliferated an “experience of belief in the normative
legitimacy of capital punishment.”267 Legitimation, it is important to note, is
therefore essentially social. They also note that this social belief was “false
and exaggerated” in the sense that it was induced “in the absence of or in
contradiction of evidence” to what capital punishment was “really” like.268
The researchers posit that legitimation occurs on at least two fundamental
levels: “internally” with capital sentencers and other criminal justice actors,
and “externally” with society at large.269
The narrative that I have compiled reveals legitimation on these levels
and consistent with their effects. The turn to a constitutional debate over
the death penalty overshadowed and diminished the absence of evidence of
capital punishment’s value as a deterrent. After the Court’s decision there
were pronounced changes both in courtrooms and in the national community
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at large. The frequency of executions skyrocketed and the size of death row
exploded to levels that were even higher than before abolitionist movements
in the 1960s and 1970s270 -- a complete reversal of the earlier trend.271 This
reversal was indicative of juries and judges more comfortable with doling
out death sentences. Moreover, Gallup poll data show public support for
the death penalty suddenly increasing by the late 1970s, and reaching record
highs in the 1980s and 1990s.272 The results of the Eighth Amendment debate
surrounding capital punishment seem to have had effectively led to a new
legitimation for capital punishment as a social practice.
Conclusion
A comparative analysis between the American and English abolition
narratives yields insight into an explanation of the persistence of capital
punishment in the United States today. In the first half of these narratives, the
countries both appeared to be moving in the same direction, towards the end
of capital punishment. Similarly, the initial debates over capital punishment
in each country strongly mirrored the initial debates in the other. But the
American debate suddenly changed when the NAACP’s Legal Defense
Fund made efforts to push the issue of capital punishment into the courts
and framed the discussion as one of constitutionality instead of deterrence.
At this point, abolition efforts in Congress held back while the Court wrestled
with whether or not the death penalty could be held unconstitutional.
After the debate over the death penalty in America was taken over
by the courts, time and attention were diverted away from the debate about
the efficacy of capital punishment itself, a debate that the abolitionists in
England had shown could and would likely be won with the analysis of
social scientific data. The shifted debate focused instead on the different
understandings of a normative textual phrase, “cruel and unusual,” rather
than evidence gathered from the social sciences. As the American interpretive
approach tended towards affirming the general supportive stance of the
death penalty, it soon became a new basis for its legitimation.
The narratives themselves are consistent with this explanation of the
persistence of the death penalty in the United States. Nevertheless, the social
and political worlds are complex. While the shift of the American debate to
the ambiguously written Constitution was probably not the sole factor that
led to the persistence of the death penalty, it did coincide with the point at
which the United States suddenly veered off its trend towards abolition -- a
trend that was slowly developing both in legislatures and in the community at
large. This “veering off” point becomes very pronounced when the American
abolitionist narrative is juxtaposed to that of the British, who marched slowly
and steadily towards abolition over the course of twenty years.
It is important to note that the shift to the textualist debate in America
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was not in any way preordained, but rather was the effect of abolitionist
elites and interest groups that took the initiative to push the debate out of the
legislatures and into the courts. Ironically though, the constitutional realm
gave retentionists much more ground to stand on when defending the death
penalty as it was held under scrutiny.
Further research to support the claims of this paper could look at
similar narratives in other countries with codified constitutions. Were their
abolitionist debates pushed towards textual normative standards located in
their constitutions? And if so, what were the results of those debates? Did
they confirm or reject the general opinion of that country on the issue of
capital punishment?
The legal legitimation of the death penalty can also help explain why
the practice remains so entrenched in the 21st century. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to delve into the exact terms of that legitimation today,
it does provide an account of how such legitimation may have originated
in the 1960s and 1970s. When thinking of modern social institutions, it is
necessary, I think, to trace how those institutions have developed and, more
importantly, how the ways in which we think of those institutions have
historically evolved. I hope that this paper has shed such insight into the
peculiar American death penalty, the only example of capital punishment in
the modern Western world.
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